International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New Argument for Tax Sparing:  Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting Implicit Taxes by Knoll, Michael S
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
8-25-2008 
International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New 
Argument for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by 
Crediting Implicit Taxes 
Michael S. Knoll 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, International Business Commons, International Economics 
Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Taxation Commons, and the Taxation-Transnational 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Knoll, Michael S., "International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New Argument for Tax Sparing: 
Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting Implicit Taxes" (2008). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 233. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/233 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 1
DRAFT – August 25, 2008 
 
 
 
 
International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, 
and a New Argument for Tax Sparing: 
 
Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting 
Implicit Taxes 
 
 
 
Michael S. Knoll* 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words:  tax sparing, foreign tax credit, worldwide taxation, 
competitiveness, tax competition, implicit taxes, foreign direct 
investment, international taxation, capital export neutrality 
(CEN), capital import neutrality (CIN), capital ownership 
neutrality (CON), national neutrality (NN). 
 
 
JEL Codes:  E62, F00, F13, H21, H25, K34, and O10 
 
 
• Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School; Professor of Real Estate, Wharton School; 
Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of 
Pennsylvania.  I have benefited from a presentation that I 
made at the 2007 Law and Society meetings.  I thank Alvin 
Dong for assistance with the research.  Preliminary draft – 
not for quotation or attribution without the permission of the 
author.  Copyright 2008 by Michael S. Knoll.  All rights 
reserved.  Comments welcome.  I can be reached at 
mknoll@law.upenn.edu. 
 2
DRAFT – August 25, 2008 
 
 
 
International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, 
and a New Argument for Tax Sparing: 
 
Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting 
Implicit Taxes 
 
 
 
Michael S. Knoll 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the United States’ current international tax regime 
dates back to the 1950’s.  At that time, international trade and 
cross-border investment played a much smaller role in the U.S. 
economy than they do today.  In 1960, international trade in goods 
represented 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).  In 2006, 
it accounted for 20 percent of GDP.1  In 1960, annual cross-border 
investment flows represented 1 percent of GDP.  In 2006, that 
number was 18 percent of GDP.  By 2006, the aggregate 
ownership of foreign capital by U.S. investors and of U.S. capital 
by foreign investors totaled $26 trillion – about two years’ GDP.2 
 
That dramatic growth in cross-border transactions is prompting 
a rethinking of international tax principles and is refocusing 
attention on how the tax system affects the competitiveness of 
U.S. workers and businesses.  Policymakers have been especially 
interested in two issues:  where investment occurs and who owns 
                                                 
1 Trade in services, which was not counted in 1960, represented another 5 percent of 
GDP. 
2 See Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Approaches to Improve 
the Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century 2 (Dec. 20, 
2007). 
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what investments.  Governments want investment to incur within 
their borders.  Domestic investment sustains employment, 
encourages economic growth and provides a tax base.  Although 
the reasons are not always as clearly articulated, governments 
also have an interest in seeing their residents – both individuals 
and business entities – own and control a substantial portion of 
both domestic and foreign assets.  Those two issues – the 
location of investment and who owns a given investment – are at 
the heart of the debate over tax sparing.3   
 
 
II. TAX SPARING 
 
Tax sparing has been described as “perhaps the most 
contentious” international tax treaty issue of the day.4  In this Part, 
I describe tax sparing, provide a brief history of the practice, and 
offer a short overview of the arguments for and against tax 
sparing.  However, before discussing tax sparing, I first provide a 
very brief introduction to cross-border taxation.  
 
A.  Territorial and Worldwide Taxation 
There are two leading paradigms for how countries tax their 
residents on their foreign income.   The two paradigms are 
territorial taxation and worldwide taxation.  Although no country is 
a perfect exemplar of either system, countries tend to cluster 
around one or the other system. 
 
A territorial tax system taxes each taxpayer only at the source.  
Income earned in one country is not taxed in any other country.  
Thus, with a territorial tax system, investment income is taxed at 
the rate applied in the source jurisdiction to local investments.  
Such a tax system is said to satisfy capital import neutrality (CIN) 
because foreign and domestic investors are subject to tax at the 
same rate on any given investment.  With a territorial tax system, 
                                                 
3 This essay is part of a larger project on taxes and competitiveness.  The first paper in 
that series is Michael S. Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness (Univ. of Penn., Inst. for 
Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 06-28, 2006), and is available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953074 (hereafter Knoll, 
Competitiveness).  The second paper in that series is Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT:  
Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?  76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 
(2007).  The third paper is Michael S. Knoll, Business Taxes and International 
Competitiveness (Univ. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 08-xx, 
2008) and is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138374.   
4 Peter D. Bryne, Treaty Prospects in Latin America, 16 Tax Notes International 45, 46 
(1998). 
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residents pay no tax in their home country on income earned 
abroad.   
 
In contrast to a territorial tax system, a worldwide tax system 
taxes income both in the country where it is earned and in the 
country where the taxpayer resides.  Long-standing convention 
gives the primary right to tax to the source country.  Accordingly, 
in order to prevent double taxation, the country of residence 
grants a foreign tax credit for the taxes that a resident taxpayer 
pays to foreign governments on foreign-source income.  In theory, 
a worldwide tax system requires an unlimited foreign tax credit.5  
With contemporaneous taxation at home and abroad, and an 
unlimited foreign tax credit, the effect of worldwide taxation is to 
tax the investor at the investor’s residence country tax rate on any 
investment.6  Such a tax system is said to satisfy capital export 
neutrality (CEN) because an investor is subject to the same tax 
rate regardless of the location where the income arises. 
 
Territorial and worldwide tax systems are the principal ideals in 
cross-border taxation today.  There is a third tax system, largely 
out of favor, which is similar to a worldwide tax system in that it 
subjects foreign income to tax, but differs from a worldwide tax 
system in that it does not provide a foreign tax credit.  Instead, 
foreign investors include their after-tax foreign income in their 
home country income.  In effect, such a tax system provides a 
deduction for taxes paid to foreign governments on foreign source 
income.  Such a tax system is said to satisfy national neutrality 
(NN). 
 
NN is sometimes said to encourage the maximization of 
national welfare because it places the same value on host country 
tax revenues and the revenues of host country actors, while at the 
same time placing no value on foreign country tax revenues.  That 
is to say, NN values home country tax revenues, but not foreign 
country tax revenues.  Accordingly, NN has been widely rejected 
as an appropriate welfare benchmark for international taxation 
because of its beggar-thy-neighbor quality.  If everyone followed 
NN, there would be much less cross-border investment and a 
substantial welfare loss.  Even commentators who advocate 
adopting an international tax system that maximizes national, as 
                                                 
5 A country with an unlimited foreign tax credit will refund taxes on domestic income if 
the source country tax on foreign income exceeds the residence country tax on that 
income.  No country offers a truly unlimited foreign tax credit. 
6 Throughout this essay, I largely ignore the possibility of deferring residence country 
taxation with a worldwide tax system.  Conceptually, such deferral is effectively a 
reduction in the excess of the home country tax rate over the source country tax rate. 
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opposed to global welfare, generally reject NN because of the 
likelihood of retaliation and the subsequent loss of national 
welfare.  NN, however, plays a significant role in understanding 
the economic consequences of tax sparing.  
 
B.  What is Tax Sparing? 
Host countries grant investment tax incentives in order to 
attract foreign investment so as to promote economic 
development.7  In order for a tax incentive offered by a host 
country government to have its intended effect, the country of 
residence must not collect (at the same time and in the same 
amount) the tax revenue that the host country foregoes.  When 
the country of residence has a territorial tax system, the incentive 
remains intact because the country of residence does not tax 
foreign source income. 
 
In contrast, for a country with a worldwide tax system, the 
foreign tax credit only credits taxes paid by the taxpayer to a 
foreign government.  Accordingly, when the foreign investor is a 
resident of a country with a worldwide tax system, the tax 
incentive will not reduce the investor’s tax.  Instead, the residence 
country will collect the tax that the host country spares.  In that 
case, the tax incentive merely shifts tax revenue from the treasury 
of the host country that foregoes the tax to that of the residence 
country.   
 
If, however, the country of residence has a tax sparing 
agreement with the source country that applies to the tax 
incentive, then the residence country will give its investor a foreign 
tax credit for the taxes that investor did not pay to the host country 
by virtue of the host country’s tax incentives.  That is to say, the 
investor will receive a foreign tax credit for taxes that have been 
“spared” by the host country.8  In that case, the tax incentive will 
reduce the total taxes paid by the investor and collected by the 
host government.  Also, the incentive will have no impact on the 
taxes collected by the government of the country of residence.  
Thus, the question whether or not to engage in tax sparing arises 
only when a country has a worldwide tax system. 
 
                                                 
7 For an extensive study of investment tax incentives in the international context, see 
Alex Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (2004). 
8 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Tax Sparing:  A Reconsideration 11 (1998) 
(hereafter OECD, Reconsideration). 
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C.  The History of Tax Sparing9 
The history of tax sparing dates back more than 50 years.  In 
1953, the British Royal Commission looking at whether to use tax 
policy to aid British overseas investment recommended that Great 
Britain adopt tax sparring.  The issue was debated in Parliament 
before it was finally rejected by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
1957.  The discussion in Britain over tax sparing, however, 
continued, and in 1961, tax sparing legislation was enacted in the 
United Kingdom.10 
 
Ironically, tax sparing first appearance in a tax treaty is in a 
treaty negotiated between the United States and Pakistan.  The 
1957 United States – Pakistan draft treaty provided for temporary 
tax sparing on the business income of U.S. taxpayers partially or 
fully exempt from tax by a Pakistani statute.  The U.S. Senate, 
however, disapproved of the tax sparing provision and refused to 
ratify the treaty.  Since that time, the United States has steadfastly 
opposed the inclusion of tax sparing provisions in its income tax 
treaties.11  As a result, the United States has never ratified a treaty 
with a tax sparing provision.12 
 
In spite of consistent U.S. opposition, there was widespread 
adoption and use of tax sparing provisions beginning in the 1960’s 
and continuing into the 1990’s.  Such provisions were included in 
many treaties, especially between developed countries and 
developing countries.13  Those treaties – many of which are still in 
force today – generally provide for tax sparing by the developed 
country in favor of the developing country.  That is to say, the 
developed country agrees to provide its residents with a foreign 
tax credit for the taxes that its residents do not pay to the host 
country on source income earned in the source country by virtue 
of a specified foreign tax incentive.  
 
                                                 
9 For a thoughtful and detailed history of tax sparing, see Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing:  
Should High-Income Countries Protect the Tax Incentives of Low-Income Countries? 
(2007), unpublished manuscript, on file with the author. 
10 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 15.  
11 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 15-16. 
12 Whether a specific provision is or is not a tax sparing provision is not always clear.  
For example, Article X of the income tax treaty between Germany and the United 
States provides that Germany will reduce its dividend withholding tax to 10 percent, but 
the United States would grant a 15 percent credit.  Such a provision might be thought to 
be a form of tax sparing. 
13 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], Annex II 64-66 (tax sparing provisions among 
OECD countries); Annex III 67-69 (tax sparing provisions between OECD and non-
OECD countries). 
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As of 1998, among the 29 members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),14 all but the 
United States has included a tax sparing provision in at least one 
of its international tax treaties.  And most member countries had 
many treaties with tax sparing.15  
 
Within the OECD, the most frequent beneficiaries of tax 
sparing provisions are the following countries:  Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.  Reciprocal 
grants of tax sparing are rare.  The one notable exception is for 
treaties to which South Korea is a party.  As of 1998, South Korea 
had 6 such treaties with other OECD members.  As of 1998, other 
countries with more than one treaty with reciprocal tax sparing 
provisions are the following:  Italy (4), Czech Republic (2), and 
Turkey (2). 
 
Almost all OECD members have tax sparing provisions in 
treaties with non-OECD members.  Among the non-OECD 
countries that are most frequently the beneficiaries of tax sparing 
by OECD members are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.  
Many developing countries choose not to have a tax treaty rather 
than to enter into one that does not grant it tax sparing.  
Accordingly, the United States, because of its opposition to tax 
sparing, has a much smaller network of international tax treaties 
than do many other OECD countries. 16 
 
The growth of tax sparing provisions came to “a relatively 
abrupt halt” about ten years.17  In 1998, the OECD issued a 
report, called Tax Sparing:  A Reconsideration.18  In that report, 
the OECD questions the merits of tax sparing and calls for a 
collective reconsideration of the practice.  As the OECD writes: 
 
“Many OECD Member countries that have been 
critical to or opposed to inclusion of tax sparing 
provisions in treaties apply the credit method to 
                                                 
14 The OECD is an international organization of 30 member countries that accept the 
principles of representative democracy and free market economics.  Slovakia, the 30th 
member, joined in 2000. 
15 See OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], Annex II 64-66 (tax sparing provisions 
among OECD countries); Annex III 67-69 (tax sparing provisions between OECD and 
non-OECD countries). 
16 Damian Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing Countries:  
The Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms, 20 Va. Tax Rev. 467, 471 
(2000). 
17 Brooks, supra note [], at [13]. 
18 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note []. 
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avoid double taxation.  These countries generally 
take the view that the overall tax system of a 
particular country should be neutral so that the tax 
consequences of investment decisions ought to be 
the same regardless of whether the investment is 
made at home or abroad.  Tax considerations 
should not influence investors’ decisions to invest 
domestically or abroad.” 
 
“To satisfy this objective, many such countries 
apply the foreign tax credit method in taxing foreign 
source income.  Tax sparing provisions are 
incompatible with the policy behind the credit 
method in that they preserve the effectiveness of 
foreign tax incentives, making it more favorable, with 
respect to taxation, to invest abroad than at home.”19 
 
Nonetheless, the OECD report did not call upon member 
countries to stop granting tax sparing.   Instead, the OECD 
acknowledged the existing practice of countries deciding whether 
or not to include a tax sparing provision in their bilateral treaties.  
In addition to calling for reconsideration, the OECD listed what it 
described as best practices that countries should follow if they 
grant tax sparing.  Those practices, many of which were already 
being followed by many member countries, include the following:  
defining the covered tax incentive precisely and not providing for 
open-ended tax sparing;20 restricting the tax sparing credit for 
local as opposed to export activities;21 setting a maximum tax rate 
for the credit;22 denying any tax sparing credit for income exempt 
from tax in the country of residence;23 inclusion of an anti-abuse 
clause;24 inclusion of time limitations or sunset clauses;25 and only 
granting tax sparing to a country at a considerably lower level of 
economic development, which should be determined by objective 
criteria.26 
 
For example, in the ten years since the release of the OECD 
report, neither Australia nor the United Kingdom has granted tax 
sparing provisions in any of its tax treaties.27  And Canada has 
                                                 
19 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 19. 
20 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 35-36. 
21 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 36. 
22 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 36-37. 
23 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 37. 
24 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 37. 
25 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 37-38. 
26 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 38. 
27 Brooks, supra note [], at [17]. 
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only granted one tax sparing provision since 2000 – to Mongolia – 
and that provision included a 3-year sunset provision.28  That the 
United Kingdom has not granted a tax sparing provision since 
1997 is noteworthy because 46 of its international treaties in force 
contain such a provision.29   
 
Tax sparing, however, is not dead.  A 2003 study by Victor 
Thuronyi found that between 2000 and 2003 approximately one 
third (33 of 107) of the tax treaties negotiated by countries (other 
than the United States) that tax  their residents on their worldwide 
business income contained a tax sparing clause.30  Out of 
Thuronyi’s sample of 107 tax treaties, 70 treaties involved at least 
one OECD member country, but only 16 (23 percent) of those 
treaties contained a tax sparing provision.  
 
 
D.  The Standard Arguments for Tax Sparing and the Response of 
Critics 
Since the issue first surfaced more than fifty years ago, the 
merits of tax sparing have been hotly debated by academics and 
other commentators.  The debate continues today.  The 
proponents of tax sparing have made a range of arguments in an 
attempt to justify tax sparing and encourage its adoption.31  Critics 
                                                 
28 Brooks, supra note [], at [17]. 
29 Brooks, supra note [], at [18]. 
30 Victor Thuronyi, Recent Treaty Practices on Tax Sparing, 29 Tax Notes Int’l 301 
(2003). 
31 Examples of articles that generally support tax sparing include the following:  
William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing 
and Development:  It is all about Source!, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 349 (2007); B. Anthony 
Billings & Gary A. McGill, Tax Sparing on U.S. Multinationals, 7 Tax Notes Int’l 31 
(1993); Karen Brown, Missing Africa:  Should U.S. International Tax Rules 
Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries? 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 45 
(2002); John Darcy, the Effect of Tax Sparing on United States Businesses in China, 21 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 393 (1986-87); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. 
Shay, Fairness in International Taxation:  The Ability to Pay Case for Taxing 
Worldwide Income, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 299 (2001); Richard Kuhn, United States Tax 
Policy with Respect to Less Developed Countries, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 261 (1963-
1964); Laurey, supra note []; Yoram Margaloith, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Growth:  Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 
Va. Tax Rev. 161 (2003); Paul R. McDaniel, Identification of the “Tax” in “Effective 
Tax Rates,” “Tax Reform” and “Tax Equity,” 38 Nat’l Tax J. 273 (1985) (hereafter 
McDaniel, Identification); Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign 
Source Income Earned in Developing Countries:  A Policy Analysis, 35 Geo. Wash 
Int’l L. Rev. 265 (2003) (hereafter, McDaniel, Policy); Young Suk Oh, A Critique of 
U.S. Policy on the Tax Sparing Credit, From the Perspective of Less Developed 
Countries, 15 Koran J. Comp. L 38 (1987); Robert Peroni, Response to Professor 
McDaniel’s Article, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 297 (2003); Harry A. Shannon III, Tax 
Incentives and Tax Sparing, 2 Intertax 84 (1992); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., The Case 
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have responded directly to those arguments and have offered 
other arguments against tax sparing.32  Those arguments have 
also drawn responses from proponents.  A thorough and 
comprehensive canvassing of those arguments is beyond the 
scope of this essay.33  In this Part, I present a brief summary of 
the major arguments for and against tax sparing. 
 
Although the proponents of tax sparing have produced a wide 
range of arguments for tax sparing, three arguments are most 
commonly advanced as justifications for tax sparing.  Those 
arguments and the responses of critics of tax sparing are 
discussed next.  I then briefly discuss some of the critics’ other 
arguments against tax sparing. 
 
One of the most frequently offered justifications for tax sparing 
is that tax sparing is and should be part of a developed nation’s 
foreign aid program.  Many countries, especially poor and 
developing countries, offer tax incentives to attract foreign direct 
investment.  Foreign investment brings capital, jobs and training to 
countries with high levels of poverty and unemployment.  
Investment tax incentives are offered by a developing country as a 
tool for promoting its own economic development.34 
 
A tax sparing agreement will allow tax incentives to redound to 
the benefit of the foreign investor.  In contrast, when the country of 
residence does not engage in tax sparing, the tax incentive will be 
swallowed by the residence country treasury.  In that case, there 
is no chance for the tax incentive to have its intended effect.35 
 
Critics of tax sparing will often concede that encouraging 
development is an admirable goal and that wealthy countries 
should do more.  They argue, however, that tax sparing is an 
inefficient and undesirable means of providing such assistance.  
They point to the lack of governmental control and supervision, 
the inability to set amounts (either as floors or ceilings), and 
                                                                                                                       
for Tax Sparing Along with Expanding and Limiting the Subpart F Regime, 35 Geo 
Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 303 (2003). 
32 Examples of articles that generally oppose tax sparing include the following:  Kim 
Brooks, supra note []; William J. Martin, Treaty Tax-Sparing Credits, 27 Tax Mgmt 
Int’l J. 444; Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing, Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49 Can 
Tax J. 879 (2001). 
33 For a thoughtful and recent assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
most of the arguments for and against tax sparing, see Brooks, supra note [], at [17]-
[45]. 
34 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 19. 
35 Viewed from this perspective, tax sparing is seen as a concession by the developed 
country to the developing country. 
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frequently question whether the tax sparing credit will do much 
good for the host country. 
 
A second argument that is often made is that tax sparing is an 
appropriate means of showing respect for foreign sovereignty over 
a foreign country’s own economy.  The proponents of tax sparing 
argue that countries should be able to set tax rates on activities 
that occur within their borders.  However, the source country 
effectively loses that authority when the investment comes from 
abroad, the investment benefits from tax incentives, and the 
country of residence does not grant tax sparing.  In that case, any 
tax incentive goes from the host country treasury to the residence 
country treasury.   
 
Critics of tax sparing reject this argument.  Carried out to its 
logical extension, they argue, the proponents’ argument calls for 
the country of residence to have a territorial tax system (at least 
for active business income).  Moreover, such an argument seems 
far too flimsy of a foundation for such an important decision as 
whether or not to tax residents on their territorial or worldwide 
incomes.  Less philosophically, critics also argue that the country 
of residence has a legitimate interest in how its residents are 
taxed.  Thus, they argue that claims of sovereignty are not helpful 
in deciding whether to provide for tax sparing.36  
 
A third rationale sometimes offered for tax sparing is that a tax-
sparing provision is necessary in order to prevent domestically 
based multinational enterprises (MNEs) from being disadvantaged 
relative to their foreign-based peers.  The concern is that if some 
countries offer tax sparing provisions then MNEs based in those 
countries will be at a competitive advantage relative to MNEs from 
those countries that do not offer those provisions.37  In contrast 
with the first two arguments, under this argument, tax sparing is 
seen not as a concession from developed to developing country, 
but as a form of tax competition among developed countries. 
 
Critics, however, note that any form of tax reduction is likely to 
improve the competitiveness of the investor receiving the tax 
reduction.  Such an argument without more is, thus, an argument 
to cut taxes across the board – at least for residents with foreign 
source income – because they are competing with other investors 
some of which are likely to pay more tax.  As with the argument 
immediately above, this argument would seem to also lead to a 
territorial tax system.  Properly understood, such an argument is 
                                                 
36 Peroni, supra note []. 
37 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 19. 
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not an argument for tax sparing because it is not tied to or limited 
to tax sparing. 
 
In addition to responding to the arguments of proponents for 
tax sparing, the critics of tax sparing also offer a series of 
arguments against the practice.  First, some critics of tax sparing 
argue that tax sparing is inconsistent with the logic of the foreign 
tax credit, which is that foreign income should be taxed once and 
only once.  Tax sparing violates that central principle because 
income that benefits from a foreign tax incentive and then goes 
untaxed by the country of residence is not taxed at all. 
 
Second, some critics of tax sparing point out that although tax 
incentives and direct incentives are economically equivalent – 
both benefit the investor at the expense of the source treasury – 
those two types of government programs are treated similarly for 
tax purposes when the country of residence does not grant tax 
sparing and differently when it does.  Tax sparing, thus, provides 
foreign countries with an incentive to favor tax incentives over 
other economically equivalent investment incentives.  In addition, 
the widespread practice of not granting tax concessions when the 
source country offers other types of investment incentives 
demonstrates the conceptual failing of tax sparing. 
 
Third, some critics of tax sparing argue that their opposition to 
tax sparing is not so much because tax sparing is itself harmful.  
Instead, they argue that the real problem is with tax incentives.  
Tax incentives, so the argument goes, distort investment 
decisions, produce waste and inefficiency, and encourage a 
harmful race to the bottom among nations.  Viewed from this 
perspective, countries have an obligation to refrain from tax 
sparing as a means of discouraging other countries from offering 
tax incentives. 
 
Fourth, some critics of tax sparing point out that tax sparing 
provisions are often abused.  The OECD Report lists four types of 
abuse.  They are: transfer pricing, conduit situations, routing, and 
the maintenance of artificially high tax rates.38  Except for the 
possibility of a country setting an artificially high tax rate so that it 
can lower that rate by granting investment tax incentives and 
thereby generate extra tax sparing credits for the investor, the 
other abuses are all the types of abuses that arise whenever there 
are tax differences across countries.  Thus, such arguments 
would not seem to be especially forceful as applied to tax sparing.  
In contrast, the possibility of the source country government 
                                                 
38 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 28-30. 
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setting an artificially high tax rate on the books and to effectively 
lower that tax rate with tax incentives is an argument against tax 
sparing.    
 
III. HOW FOREIGN TAX INCENTIVES DISADVANTAGE U.S. COMPETITORS 
 
In this Part, I describe how foreign tax incentives disadvantage 
U.S. investors and investors from other countries that have 
adopted a worldwide (residence-based) tax system and do not 
engage in tax sparing.  This Part is divided into four sections.  In 
the first section, I introduce a simple example that illustrates the 
disadvantage.  In the second section, I provide the intuition for 
that result.  In the third section, I show that a comparable problem 
does not occur with a territorial (source-based) tax system.  In the 
fourth section, I briefly describe several empirical studies that 
have looked at the impact that tax incentives and tax sparing have 
had on cross-border investment. 
 
A.  A Simple Example 
Consider the following simple example.  There is a one-year 
investment that will pay $1100 in one year (the candidate 
investment).  Initially, there are just two countries – A and B.  
Investors from the two countries compete for the candidate 
investment, which is located in country B.  The investors are all 
assumed to be equally proficient in owning and operating the 
investment.  Thus, all investors would generate the same cash 
flow from the candidate investment suing the same inputs.  It, 
therefore, follows that in a world without taxes, investors from 
country A will value the candidate investment as much as 
investors from country B.  The assumption that all investors are 
equally proficient is not realistic.  I make it in order to isolate the 
impact of taxes.  That assumption implies that any difference in 
the value of the investment to investors from different countries is 
a result of taxes. 
 
Introduce taxes.  Country A has a worldwide tax system.  
Assume that the before-tax interest rate is 10 percent a year 
everywhere.  All of the income from the candidate investment 
arises in country B, which has the first right to tax that income.  
Thus, country B’s international tax system is largely irrelevant to 
the analysis that follows.  Assume country B imposes tax at 40 
percent.  Initially, assume country B does not offer any investment 
incentives. 
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In order to calculate the value of the candidate investment to 
investors resident in country B, we must first calculate their hurdle 
rate for new investments – the minimum rate of return that they 
must receive on their investments.39  Given a before-tax rate of 
return of 10 percent everywhere, and a 40 percent tax rate 
everywhere, investors from country B will earn 6 percent after tax 
wherever they invest.  Thus, they must earn the same 6 percent 
(or more) after tax on the candidate investment or they will not 
hold it.  Given a 40 percent tax rate, an after-tax rate of return of 6 
percent translates into a 10 percent before-tax rate of return.  It, 
thus, follows that the maximum amount that investors resident in 
country B will pay for the candidate investment is $1000.40 
 
We can perform a similar exercise for potential acquirers of the 
candidate investment resident in country A.  The assumption that 
country A has a worldwide tax system (with an unlimited foreign 
tax credit) implies that investors from country A earn 10 percent 
on their alternative investments everywhere they invest.  In order 
to illustrate some of the subtleties with tax sparing it is helpful to 
assume that the countries have different tax rates.  Thus, assume 
that the residents of country A are taxed at 50 percent on their 
worldwide income.  Thus, they will earn 5 percent after tax on their 
alternative investments.  With their 50 percent tax rate, that 5 
percent after-tax rate of return translates into the same 10 percent 
before tax rate of return.  Thus, the maximum amount that an 
investor from country A will pay for the candidate investment is 
also $1000.41 
                                                 
39 In order to calculate the value of the candidate investment to a potential investor, the 
following notation is helpful.  Denote the pre (explicit) tax cash flow from the 
candidate investment by C, the before-tax return on alternative investments by R, the 
total tax rate imposed on an investor from country i on alternative investments by ti, the 
total tax imposed on an investor from country i on the candidate investment by tj, and 
the price paid by an investor from country i for the candidate investment by Vi.  An 
investor from country i will have C(1- tj) +Vtj after paying taxes on the candidate 
investment.  That same investor must receive at least Vi(1+R(1- ti)) or will forego the 
candidate investment for other investments.  Equating those two expressions and 
rearranging terms, yields the maximum bid price for the candidate investment by an 
investor from country i:  Vi = C(1- tj) /[1- tj+ R(1-ti)]. 
40 If the candidate investment is taxed the same as other investments, ti = tj , then the 
equation in footnote [] for the maximum bid price an investor in country I will pay for 
the candidate investment simplifies to Vi = C/(1+R).  Substituting $1100 for C and 10 
percent for R into that equation yields $1000.   That an investor from country B is 
willing to pay up to $1000 to acquire the candidate investment can be seen as follows.  
In one year, that investor will receive $1100.  Of that amount, $100 is income.  The 
country B investor pays $40 tax on that income and so is left with $1060.  Thus, the 
investor earns an after-tax return of 6 percent, which confirms that such investor is 
willing to pay up to $1000 for the candidate investment. 
41 That can be seen using the equation in footnote [] and substituting $1100 for C and 
10 percent for R.  As is apparent from that equation, when the candidate investment is 
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In one year, that investor will receive $1100 and pay $40 tax to 
country B on $100 income.  That investor will also report $100 
income to the tax authorities in country A and be assessed a tax 
liability to country A’s fisc of $50.  That investor will also receive a 
foreign tax credit of $40 and so will owe an additional $10 tax to 
country A.  Thus, the investor from country A will pay $50 tax in 
total and be left with $1050.  Such an investor will value the 
candidate investment at $1000 because the candidate investment 
generates the same after-tax return of 5 percent as other 
investments.  
 
As the example above illustrates, investors from countries A 
and B both value the candidate investment at $1000.  Thus, 
neither party has a tax-induced advantage in acquiring the asset.  
Accordingly, if one investor were able to squeeze more value out 
of the candidate investment, say an additional $1.10, it would be 
able to outbid other potential buyers, by $1, to acquire the 
candidate investment.  In such circumstances, the tax system is 
neutral with respect to who will acquire the asset.  That is to say, 
the tax system does not affect the ownership of assets because it 
does not change relative values across investors.42 
 
Introduce a very simple tax incentive.  Assume country B 
exempts the return from the candidate investment from tax in that 
country.  For investors resident in country B, only the tax rate in 
country B is directly relevant.  If that tax rate is reduced to 0, then 
if the candidate investment still costs $1000 and still pays $1100 
in one year, then investors in country B will find the candidate 
investment more attractive than alternative investments.  Under 
those assumptions, the candidate investment pays 10 percent 
after-tax, whereas all other investments return 6 percent after tax.  
Thus, competition for the candidate investment will increase and 
that competition will tend to reduce the return from holding that 
asset.  Assume that the price of the candidate investment remains 
at $1000, but that increased competition due to the tax incentive 
                                                                                                                       
taxed the same as other investments in the economy, then the value of the candidate 
investment to an investor does not depend on that investor’s tax rate. 
42 The examples in this essay assume that the investors operate with fixed stocks of 
capital.  That assumption implies that equally efficient investors with different tax rates 
will value ordinarily taxed assets at the same amount.  If, however, the investors are 
conduits, then the conduit that is subject to a lower tax rate will enjoy an advantage.  
See Knoll, Competitiveness, supra note [].  Under such circumstances differentially 
taxed assets have the small type of consequences as described below, but the exposition 
and arithmetic are more complicated. 
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drives the cash flow from the investment down to $1060.43  At that 
point, investors in country B are indifferent between the candidate 
investment and alternative investments.44 
 
What about an investor from country A?  Because country B 
has exempted the candidate investment from tax in that country, 
an investor from country A will not pay any tax to country B if it 
acquires that investment.  However, because country A has a 
worldwide tax system with a foreign tax credit, and because the 
investor does not pay any tax to country B, that investor will not 
receive a foreign tax credit from country A.  Thus, the investor 
from country A will pay tax at 40 percent to country A on its 
income from the candidate investment in country B.  Assuming 
that the country A investor purchases the candidate investment for 
$1000 and that the investment produces $1060, the investor will 
report $60 in income to country A and be assessed a tax liability 
of $30.  Because the investor pays no tax to country B, the 
investor does not receive a foreign tax credit, and so the investor 
will pay $30 in taxes to country A.  That will leave the country A 
investor with $1030 after paying tax. 
 
For the investor from country A, that translates into an after-tax 
return of only 3 percent a year.  Because the after-tax return on 
the candidate investment to the country A investor is less than 6 
percent – the return that such an investor earns on other available 
investments – a country A investor will not be willing to bid as 
much as $1000 for the candidate investment.  Indeed, the most an 
investor from country A will pay for the candidate investment is 
$963.64.45     It, thus, follows investors from country B will outbid 
investors from country A for the candidate investment.  Because 
both groups of investors are assumed to be equally productive 
and efficient, the difference in maximum bid prices is a result of 
taxes.  Specifically, country B’s tax incentives disadvantage 
investors from country A relative to investors from country B. 
 
Moreover, the tax advantage enjoyed by investors from 
country B relative to those from country A is an increasing function 
of the magnitude of the tax incentive country B provides.46  As 
                                                 
43 That is easiest to visualize when there is free entry into the industry so that tax 
incentives bring forth more production, thereby lowering output and profits.   
44 More formally, that can be seen using the equation in footnote [] and setting C equal 
to $1060, ti equal to 0 and tj equal to 40 percent.  
45 That can be seen using the equation in footnote [] and setting C equal to $1060, ti 
equal to 50 percent and tj equal to 50 percent. 
46 It might be thought that the disadvantage that arises in the example is an artifact of 
country A having a higher tax rate than country B.  It is not.  Regardless of relative tax 
rates, tax incentives will still disadvantage foreign investors.  This can be demonstrated 
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described above, when there is no tax incentive, there is no 
difference in bid prices.  Investors from both countries value the 
candidate investment at $1000.  If the tax incentive cuts the 
statutory tax rate in half – from 40 percent to 20 percent – then the 
candidate investment is still worth $1000 to investors from country 
B, but it will be worth only $977.27 to investors from country A.  
That difference, $22.73, is less than the difference with complete 
exemption, $36.36.  Table 1 below gives the maximum bid price 
for investors from countries A and B and the difference (the tax-
based advantage enjoyed by investors from country B) between 
them both in dollars and as a percentage of the $1000 bid price of 
country B investors.47  That table shows that the larger the tax 
incentive provided by country B the bigger the advantage enjoyed 
by investors from country B over investors from country A.48 
 
PLACE TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                                                                                       
by assuming that the tax rate in country A is alternatively 30 percent (lower than that of 
country B) and 40 percent (equal to that of country B).  Start with a 30 percent tax rate 
and assume that the foreign tax credit is limited to 30 percent.  As country B reduces 
the tax on the candidate investment, the market rate of return from holding the 
candidate investment falls.  As long as the tax rate on the candidate investment in 
country B is at least 30 percent, the investor will pay no tax on the candidate investment 
to country A.  Thus, tax incentives that reduce the tax on the candidate investment from 
40 percent down to 30 percent are not offset by country A.  Hence, over that range, tax 
incentives benefit investors from country A as well as from country B.  However, once 
the tax rate on the candidate investment in country B reaches the statutory tax rate in 
country A (30 percent), then any further tax incentives will reduce the explicit tax rate 
for investors resident in country B, but not for those resident in country A.  At this 
point, additional tax incentives granted to residents of country A are offset by additional 
taxes paid to country A.  Such tax incentives, therefore, disadvantage investors from 
country A relative to those from country B.  Consider a 40 percent tax rate in country 
A.  In that case, an investor from country A pays no tax on the full return from any 
investment in country B taxed at the statutory rate of 40 percent.  Accordingly, as the 
tax assessed on the candidate investment by country B falls, the tax collected by 
country A increases, thereby disadvantaging investors from country A. 
47 The maximum bid prices in Table 1 are calculated as follows.  First, the cash flow 
from the candidate investment, C, is calculated by rearranging the equation in footnote 
[] to solve for C instead of for Vi and setting Vi  = $1000, ti = 50 percent and tj equal to 
the tax rate in the top row of Table 1.  That gives the cash flow from the candidate 
investment assuming that investors from country B determine the equilibrium cash 
flow.  The maximum bid price to an investor in country A is then calculated using that 
same equation, but in its original form, so it solves for Vi not C, using the derived value 
for C and setting ti = tj = 40 percent, which simplifies to Vi = C/(1+R) when ti = tj. 
48 Interestingly, the disadvantage is independent of the tax rate in the country of 
residence.  That is because a higher tax rate decreases the return on alternative assets 
and the candidate investment proportionately. 
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B.  The Source of the Tax Disadvantage 
As demonstrated in the last section, tax incentives provided by 
country B on domestic investments will disadvantage investors 
from country A relative to those from country B.  More generally, 
tax incentives will disadvantage foreign investors from countries 
that impose tax on the worldwide income of their residents relative 
to investors from the country that offers the incentive. In this 
section, I describe the intuition behind that result.  In brief, the 
advantage that investors from the source country enjoy over 
investors from abroad arises because the foreign tax credit does 
not credit implicit taxes.  The foreign tax credit only credits explicit 
taxes.  In effect, when the source country provides investment tax 
incentives, it is substituting implicit taxes (not credited) for explicit 
taxes (credited).  Because implicit taxes are not creditable, an 
investor from country A pays taxes twice – once explicitly and 
once implicitly – when the source country offers a tax incentive.  
That such double taxation is the source of the disadvantage can 
be illustrated by returning to the example. 
 
As the example demonstrates, the tax benefit that country B 
provides to the owner of the candidate investment increases the 
attractiveness of that investment to investors from country B.  The 
tax incentive causes investors from country B to bid down the rate 
of return from holding the candidate investment.  In order for the 
tax-advantaged candidate investment to be as attractive to 
potential bidders as normally taxed alternative investments, 
investors from country B need to earn a before-tax rate of return 
of only 6 percent on the candidate investment.  That 4 percentage 
point reduction in the hurdle rate – from 10 percent to 6 percent – 
represents a 40 percent reduction in the required rate of return on 
the investment. 
 
To keep the arithmetic simple, I assume that the price of the 
candidate investment remains $1000, but that increased 
competition pushes down the cash flow from owning the 
candidate investment from $1100 to $1060.  Thus, the $40 
decrease in the cash flow produced by the candidate investment 
is a direct result of the investment incentive and market 
competition.49 
 
                                                 
49 Alternatively, the cash flow could remain at $1100 with competition driving the bid 
price up to $1037.74.  Economically, the key is that the market return drops to 6 percent 
– whether it is a decline in cash flow, a rise in price, or some combination of the two is 
irrelevant.  Throughout this essay, I assume a drop in cash flow because it illustrates the 
implicit tax most clearly and directly.  
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In the language of tax economics, the candidate investment is 
subject to an implicit tax of 40 percent or $40.  The $40 reduction 
in the cash flow from the candidate investment as a result of the 
tax incentive is itself a tax.  To the owner of the asset, the 
market’s response to the tax incentive is itself a tax.  The market’s 
response is from the perspective of the investor as much of a tax 
as any government imposed and collected tax because it reduces 
the owner’s cash flow from holding the asset by the same amount 
as an explicit tax of the same size.  The principle difference is that 
the market response is an implicit, rather than explicit, tax.  That is 
because the $40 revenue is not collected by country B’s treasury.  
Instead, the revenue, in effect, goes to providers of scarce 
resources to the industry (if costs – input prices50– increase), 
consumers (if per unit revenue – output prices – decrease), or as 
is frequently the case some combination of factor suppliers and 
consumers.  In the example, however, the benefit of the tax is 
passed through to consumers who purchase the output produced 
by the candidate investment at a lower price.51  In contrast with an 
explicit tax, which is imposed by statute and collected by tax 
authorities, an implicit tax arises through market forces.  
Competition for the higher return from owning a lightly taxed asset 
brings down the return to equilibrate the market.  That reduction in 
return is a form of tax.  It is an implicit tax. 
 
In the simple example, where the tax incentive is complete 
exemption, investors in country B, thus, see the decision whether 
to buy the candidate investment or invest in alternative assets as 
a choice between paying a 40 percent explicit tax (on the 
alternative investment) or a 40 percent implicit tax (on the 
candidate investment).  In either case, the total tax is 40 percent, 
and so investors from country B are indifferent between the two 
assets.52 
 
The calculation is different in an important respect for an 
investor from a country with a worldwide tax system.  If an investor 
from country A wants to acquire the candidate investment, that 
investor must bid at least $1000 in order to avoid being outbid by 
an investor from country B.  That implies that the country A 
investor’s return from the candidate investment after paying tax in 
country B will be 6 percent.  If an investor from country A acquires 
                                                 
50 Wages are the price paid for using labor as an input. 
51 The market equilibrium would be identical in substance, but not in form, if investors 
in the candidate investment were taxed in country B at the regular rate of 40 percent 
and country B used the revenue to subsidize consumers who purchased the output. 
52 I ignore and therefore do not discuss the possibility of investors subject to different 
tax rates sorting themselves among assets.  Such clientele effects would occur here with 
more complex tax schedules. 
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the candidate investment, then that investor pays the implicit tax 
at the same rate as an investor from country B.  Country A, 
however, has a worldwide tax system and imposes tax at a rate of 
50 percent on the global incomes of its residents.  Thus, country A 
assesses a 50 percent tax on the 6 percent return a resident of 
country A earns from holding the candidate investment.  That tax 
is an additional 3 percentage points ($30), and it drives the after-
tax rate of return down to 3 percent ($30). That is substantially 
below the return on alternative investments – 5 percent ($50) – 
and so investors from country A will avoid the candidate 
investment.53  
 
As the example makes clear, investors from country A are 
paying total tax on the candidate investment at a total tax rate that 
is substantially higher than 50 percent – the total tax rate paid by 
an investor from country B.  The total tax rate on the candidate 
investment when it is owned by investors from country A is 70 
percent, which is the sum of 40 percent implicit tax plus 30 
percent explicit tax.  The explicit tax rate is 30 percent -- not 50 
percent – because a 50 percent statutory tax is assessed on the 6 
percent after implicit tax return produced by the candidate 
investment.  The country A tax is not assessed on the 10 percent 
return before both explicit and implicit taxes.  In effect, the implicit 
tax paid in country B is deductible before assessing the explicit tax 
due to country A.  If, however, the country B tax were explicit 
rather than implicit, it would be creditable, not deductible.  As long 
as the tax rate is less than 100 percent, a credit is more valuable 
than an equivalent deduction. 
 
C.  Territorial Tax System 
It is important to point out that investors from a country with a 
territorial tax system are not disadvantaged when a foreign 
country uses tax incentive to encourage investment. Consider 
another country, country C, with a territorial tax system.  Country 
C’s investors earn the after-tax return wherever they invest.  Thus, 
they earn 6 percent in country B on the candidate investment. 
 
                                                 
53 Of course, an investor from country A might still outbid investors from country B.  
That, however, is unlikely unless such an investor is a much more productive owner of 
the candidate investment.  If the country A investor is as productive as country B 
owners or just somewhat more productive, then the tax system is changing the 
ownership of assets.  Moreover, if the country A investor is more productive than the 
country B counterpart, but not sufficiently more productive to outbid the country B 
investor, then there is an efficiency cost.  Resources are lost because the less productive 
investor owns the candidate investment. 
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Assume that the tax rate in country C is also 50 percent.  That 
implies that the before-tax return in country C is 12 percent.  
Assume initially that country B does not provide a tax incentive for 
the candidate investment.  If an investor form country C buys that 
investment for $1000, then that investor will report $100 income, 
pay $40 tax to country B, and be left with $1060 after all taxes.  
Because country C is assumed to have a territorial tax system, the 
county C investor will owe no tax to country C on the candidate 
investment, leaving the investor with $1060.  Because such an 
investor can earn the same 6 percent after taxes by investing in 
alternative assets, it follows that the candidate investment is worth 
$1000 to such an investor.  Thus, in the absence of tax incentives, 
the candidate investment is worth the same amount to an investor 
from a country with a territorial tax system as it is to a resident of 
the host country.54 
 
Assume that country B provides a tax incentive for the 
candidate investment.  In the example, country B exempts the 
return from the candidate investment from tax.  That drives the 
return on the candidate investment down to 6 percent.  In the 
example, the candidate investment costs $1000 and pays $1060.  
Investors from a country with a territorial tax system pay no tax on 
that income.  Thus, they will value the candidate investment at 
$1000 – the same as investors from the host country. 
 
Moreover, the above result does not depend upon the tax 
incentive being the full elimination of the tax.  Instead, equality is 
maintained because territorial taxation ensures no double 
taxation.  Equilibrium ensures that the total tax rate in country B is 
the same on all assets.  Territorial taxation, because it provides 
that there is no taxation in the residence country, prevents double 
taxation.55 
 
In effect, a territorial tax system, because it exempts foreign 
income from tax, treats explicit and implicit taxes the same.  It, 
                                                 
54 Once again, the result does not depend upon the assumption that the tax rate is higher 
in country C than in country B.  The result still holds if the tax rate in country C is 
equal to (40 percent) or lower than (say 30 percent) than that in country B.  Changing 
the tax rate in country C changes the before-tax return in country C, but not the after-
tax return.  Because the after-tax return to an investor from country C is still 6 percent, 
the value of the candidate investment to such an investor is still $1000. 
55 That equality will still hold if the tax rate in the country with the territorial tax system 
equals or is below that in the source country.  That is because the tax rate in the source 
country determines only the before-tax rate of return in that country, not the after-tax 
rate of return.  (It should be noted that when countries have different tax rates and not 
all countries use either territorial or worldwide taxation, the equilibrium does not have 
all countries valuing regularly taxed investments in all other countries at the same 
amount.  In the language of linear programming, there are corner solutions.) 
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thus, allows the host country to trade-off explicit and implicit taxes 
without affecting the tax paid by foreign investors to their country 
of residence.  In contrast, a worldwide tax system that does not 
provide for tax sparing does not treat explicit and implicit taxes the 
same.  Such a tax system recognizes only explicit taxes and only 
treats as taxes – and hence only credits – explicit taxes.  Such a 
system tacitly treats implicit taxes as a decrease in income – 
either a decline in gross revenue or an increase in expenses.  
Accordingly, because a deduction is less valuable than a credit of 
the same amount, investors in countries with worldwide tax 
systems are disadvantaged by tax incentives relative to other 
investors. 
 
D.  Empirical Evidence 
In its 1998 report, the OECD asserts that tax incentives and 
tax sparing have had little impact on the location of foreign 
investment.56  That assertion, however, is contradicted by the 
available empirical studies.  Those studies show that investors 
from countries that employ a worldwide tax system without tax 
sparing are at a tax-induced disadvantage relative to investors 
from countries that employ a territorial tax system or engage in tax 
sparing. 
 
In Tax Sparing Provision Influence:  A Credit versus 
Exempt Investor Analysis, Celine Azemar and Andrew Delios look 
at the impact of tax sparing provisions on the location of 
investment by French exempt investors and Japanese credit 
investors.  Using data from 54 developing countries, Azemar and 
Delios find that tax sparing provisions tend to eliminate differences 
in where investors locate their investments.57   
 
In “Tax Sparing” and Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries, James Hines compares Japanese and U.S. foreign 
direct investment in countries in which Japan has tax sparing.  
Hines find that Japan has more foreign direct investment than it 
otherwise would have had in countries in which it has tax sparing.  
In addition, Hines finds that Japanese firms are subject to total tax 
rates that are 23 percent lower than their U.S. counterparts in 
countries in which Japan has tax sparing agreements.58 
                                                 
56 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 12-13. 
57 Celine Azemar and Andrew Delios, Tax Sparing Provision Influence:  A Credit 
versus Exempt Investor Analysis, unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_44476_en.pdf. 
58 James R. Hines, Jr., “Tax Sparing” and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, 
NBER working paper 6728, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=129468. 
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The empirical studies are consistent with the analysis and 
explanation given above.  That is to say, a worldwide tax system 
without tax sparing because it does not credit explicit taxes while 
allowing only a deduction for implicit taxes disadvantages 
investors from countries that adopt worldwide tax systems and do 
not engage in tax sparing. 
 
 
IV. THE MECHANICS OF CREDITING IMPLICIT TAXES 
 
As the last part makes clear, investors from countries with 
worldwide tax systems that do not provide for tax sparing are at a 
tax-induced competitiveness advantage when competing for 
foreign investments supported by tax incentives.  As described 
above, that disadvantage occurs because the foreign tax credit – 
as currently implemented – does not treat implicit taxes in the 
same manner as explicit taxes.  The foreign tax credit treats 
explicit taxes as real taxes and so it credits them.  In contrast, the 
foreign tax credit does not treat implicit taxes as real taxes, and so 
it does not credit them.  In effect, because the foreign tax credit 
does not acknowledge the existence of implicit taxes it indirectly 
treats such taxes as reductions in income.  Thus, with a worldwide 
tax system, implicit taxes are effectively deductible from income, 
which is less valuable than a credit of the same amount.  The 
disadvantage at which investors from countries that tax their 
residents on their worldwide income find themselves can be 
eliminated by revising the foreign tax credit so that it credits both 
implicit and explicit taxes on the same terms. This Part explains 
how such a revised foreign tax credit would work.  In this Part, I 
also show that the existing method for calculating the foreign tax 
credit when there is tax sparing (sometimes referred to as the tax 
sparing credit) generally provides too much relief.59  The following 
Part discusses the reasons for crediting implicit taxes. 
 
In order to understand both why the current tax sparing credit 
produces the wrong result and how the foreign tax credit could be 
revised in order to credit implicit taxes, return to the example.  
Recall that in the example country A imposes a worldwide income 
tax at 50 percent and country B imposes a 40 percent income tax.  
Assuming that country B does not offer a tax incentive to the 
holder of the candidate investment, the owner of the candidate 
                                                 
59 If the residence country has a lower tax rate than the source country and the foreign 
tax credit is either unlimited or the taxpayer has excess foreign income that is not 
already offset with foreign tax credits, then the current method will provide too little 
relief.  
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investment acquires it for $1000, reports $100 income (a before-
tax return of 10 percent) and pays $40 tax to country B.  For an 
investor resident in country B, there are no additional taxes.  That 
leaves the investor with $1060 after taxes, which is the same 6 
percent return that the investor earns on other investments. 
 
Consider an investor from country A.  If such an investor 
acquires the candidate investment for $1000, then that investor 
reports $100 income to country A and is assessed a tax liability of 
$50.  Country A also grants that investor a foreign tax credit of 
$40 and so that investor owes an additional $10 in taxes to 
country A.60  Thus, after paying all taxes, the country A investor is 
left with $1050, which is the same 5 percent after-tax return that 
the investor earns investing in alternative assets.61 
 
Introduce the same tax incentive as before – assume that the 
candidate investment is exempt from tax in country B, the source 
jurisdiction.  Also, continue to assume, as is currently the case, 
that country A does not credit implicit taxes.  As described above, 
the candidate investment will be worth only $963.64 to an investor 
from country A.62  It, thus, follows that an investor from country B 
will outbid an equally efficient investor from country A.63 
 
The analysis and calculations are different if country A has a 
tax sparing agreement with country B that gives the country A 
investor a foreign tax credit for taxes not paid to country B by 
virtue of tax incentives provided by country B.  Assuming that 
such an investor purchases the candidate investment for $1000, 
then such an investor will report $60 of income to country B.  On 
that income, the investor will be assessed a tax liability of $24 by 
the host country.  That tax, however, is not collected by virtue of 
country B’s tax incentive.  The investor will also report $60 of 
                                                 
60 The assumptions that country A imposes a flat tax at 50 percent on the worldwide 
income if its residents and that country B imposes a flat tax at 40 percent on income 
that has its source in country B together imply that country A collects tax at an 
additional 10 percent from its overseas investors on normally taxed assets in country B. 
61 This is where the assumption that the tax rates in the source and residence country are 
not equal plays a useful pedagogical role.  If the source and residence jurisdictions 
imposed tax at the same rate, then the investor would has no tax obligation to the home 
jurisdiction.  That result masks the need to include the tax implicitly paid by the 
investor in the investor’s income. 
62 See Table 1. 
63  If such an investor paid $1000, that investor would receive $1060 and report $60 
income to country A.  On this income, the investor would owe $30 tax.  Because the 
investor pays no explicit foreign tax, the investor gets no credit for the purpose of the 
foreign tax credit.  Thus, the investor will pay an additional $30 tax.  That will leave the 
investor with only $1030, which is an after-tax return of 3 percent.  That is two 
percentage points below the return on alternative assets. 
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income to country A – the country of residence.  Given the country 
of residence’s 50 percent tax rate, the investor incurs a total tax 
liability to the country of residence of $30.  The investor from 
country A also receives a foreign tax credit of $24 – the tax not 
paid to country B by virtue of the tax incentive – leaving the 
investor with a tax liability to country A of $6.  Thus, after all taxes 
and credits, the investor from country A has an after-tax cash flow 
from the investment in the candidate investment of $1054, which 
is an after-tax return of 5.4 percent.  That return – although less 
than what an investor from country B earns on the candidate 
investment – is $4, 40 basis points, or 0.4 percent above the 
return that such an investor would earn on alternative 
investments.  Accordingly, such an investor would value the 
candidate investment at more than $1000.  Indeed, such an 
investor would value the candidate investment at $1003.81.64  
Thus, with tax sparing, as it is currently applied, investors from 
countries that offer tax sparing have a tax-induced advantage over 
investors from the host country.   
 
In effect, the country of residence is providing the investor with 
both a deduction and a foreign tax credit.  Conceptually, there is a 
single, simple mistake, which presents itself as two errors in 
computation.  The mistake is not treating the $40 implicit tax 
incurred in country B as a tax.  That mistake leads to two errors in 
the calculation of the tax that the investor owes to country A.  
First, the investor reports pretax income of only $60 instead of 
$100 to country A.  Second, the investor receives a foreign tax 
credit from country A of only $24, not $40.  At the investor’s 50 
percent tax rate, the investor pays only $6 in tax to country A, not 
$10, which accounts for the $4 difference.65 
 
In contrast with the traditional tax sparing calculation, the 
conceptually correct way to credit implicit taxes requires first that 
the before all tax (including implicit tax) cash flow be assessed.66  
That cash flow cannot be directly observed because that cash 
flow is not part of any market transaction.  Instead, that cash flow 
must be constructed indirectly.  In the example, that is simple to 
                                                 
64 The value of the candidate investment to an investor from country A is calculated as 
follows:  $1003.81 = $1054/1.05. 
65 If, however, the tax rate in the source country is above the tax rate in the country of 
residence (assuming that the foreign tax credit is either unlimited or that the investor 
has excess foreign income the tax on which can be offset by additional foreign tax 
credits), then the traditional method of calculating the tax sparing credit will advantage 
foreign investors relative to domestic investors. 
66 For proposals to revise the calculation of the foreign tax credit and tax sparing credit 
in a similar manner by including the amount of any tax incentive in pre-tax income, see 
McDaniel, Policy, supra note [], at 274-76; Shannon, supra note []. 
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do.  Equally risky alternative assets that are taxed in the ordinary 
course yield 10 percent.  Therefore, the candidate investment 
yields a before-tax return of 10 percent.  The 4 percentage point 
reduction in the rate of return or $40 reduction in cash return is an 
implicit tax.  Thus, the $40 implicit tax must be added to the 
observed $60 cash flow to arrive at the investor’s before-all-tax 
cash flow of $100.  On that return, country A assesses an explicit 
tax of 50 percent. Thus, the investor’s tax liability to country A is 
$50.  Against this $50 tax, the investor gets credit for $40 implicit 
tax paid to B.  That leaves the investor with a net tax liability to 
country A of $10.  Of course, 10 percent of $100 is $10.  Hence, 
the investor from country A pays total tax of $50 on the candidate 
investment, which leaves $1050 after tax, which is equivalent to 
an after-tax return of 5 percent.  Such an investor from country A 
is willing to pay the same $1000 for the candidate investment as a 
similar investor from country B or country C.  Thus, in order for the 
foreign tax credit to credit accurately and properly implicit taxes 
incurred in the source country the country of residence must add 
to the investor’s income as conventionally calculated any implicit 
taxes incurred in the source country in order to get back to pre-tax 
income.  The country of residence must then credit the amount of 
implicit tax paid against the investor’s tax obligation.  If the foreign 
tax credit is calculated in such a manner, then investors from a 
country with a worldwide tax system will not be at a tax-induced 
competitive disadvantage by virtue of the tax incentives.67 
 
 
V. THE CASE FOR CREDITING IMPLICIT TAXES 
 
This Part is divided into four sections.  In the first section, I 
develop the arguments for crediting implicit taxes.  In that section, 
I show that many of the arguments made against tax sparing 
actually support tax sparing once tax incentives are recognized as 
creating implicit taxes.  In the second section, I describe the tax 
sparing regime to which the arguments in the first section lead.  
That tax regime extends tax sparing much further than traditional 
tax sparing.  Accordingly, I sometimes describe that system as 
crediting implicit taxes and sometimes as tax sparing.  In the third 
section, I discuss some practical issues in implementing such a 
system.  The fourth section looks at the implications of the 
                                                 
67 Assuming that the foreign tax credit is either unlimited or that the investor has excess 
foreign income the tax on which can be offset with additional tax credits, then the total 
tax with the revised foreign tax credit is just the tax rate in the country of residence.  In 
terms of the example, call that tA.  The total tax using the traditional method of 
calculating the tax sparing credit is tA – tB (tA – tB).  The former will exceed the latter 
whenever tA > tB, and conversely. 
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arguments developed in this essay for the debate over the relative 
merits of territorial and worldwide taxation. 
 
A. The Arguments in Favor of Crediting Implicit Taxes    
I present the argument for crediting implicit taxes by 
responding to critics’ arguments against tax sparing.  The critics of 
tax sparing make four main arguments against tax sparing.  First, 
they argue that tax sparing is inconsistent with fundamental tax 
principles and the justification for the foreign tax credit because 
income that receives a tax incentive from the source country and 
is not taxed by the country of residence is never taxed.  Second, 
they argue that tax sparing treats tax incentives better than direct 
incentives, which in turn provides foreign governments with an 
incentive to favor tax incentives over direct grants.  Third, 
although many critics of tax sparing concede that tax sparing will 
improve the competitiveness of domestic investors, they argue 
that improving competitiveness is not a reason to favor tax sparing 
because any decrease in the tax rates on domestic firms will do 
likewise.  Fourth, the critics of tax sparing argue that tax sparing 
provisions can be abused, most readily by the source 
government, which can set an artificially high tax rate solely with 
the intention of lowering that tax rate. 
 
In the rest of this section, I show that once one recognizes that 
tax incentives give rise to implicit taxes and implicit taxes are 
indeed taxes, then each of those 4 arguments against tax sparing 
is turned on its head.  That is to say, each of those arguments 
becomes a reason to grant tax sparing, not an argument against 
it, once implicit taxes are recognized as taxes. 
 
1. Tax sparing is necessary to prevent double taxation 
and to ensure that all income is taxed once and only 
once 
 
One argument regularly made by critics of tax sparing is that 
tax sparing is inconsistent with one of the fundamental tenets of 
the income tax – that all income regardless of source should be 
taxed once and only once.  Critics argue that income that is not 
taxed at the source by virtue of a tax incentive and is not taxed at 
the investor’s residence by virtue of a tax sparing agreement 
escapes tax in violation of that principle.  Accordingly, they argue 
that rejecting tax sparing and taxing that income in the investor’s 
residence provides one level of taxation. 
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The analysis above, however, leads to the opposite 
conclusion:  tax sparing is not inconsistent with basic principles of 
how income is calculated and taxed. Rather than being an 
exception or deviation from those principles, tax sparing is 
required by those principles. It is the failure to engage in tax 
sparing that is the violation of standard tax norms. That is to say, 
in spite of its name, tax sparing does not spare income from tax.  
In contrast, it ensures that an investor’s income is taxed once and 
only once. A system without tax sparing violates tax norms 
because it taxes income twice- once implicitly and then again 
explicitly.  Such double taxation is inconsistent with fundamental 
tax principles and the justification for a foreign tax credit.68  
 
The problem with much current practice is that it fails to 
recognize implicit taxes as taxes and so it does not provide a 
credit for implicit taxes.  It is that failure to recognize and treat 
implicit taxes as real taxes that is the source of the problem with 
the current hostility towards tax sparing.  Accordingly, what the tax 
law needs to do is to make explicit recognition of implicit taxes 
and to treat such taxes as real taxes. 69 
 
Once implicit taxes are recognized as taxes, the practice of not 
crediting implicit taxes and not engaging in tax sparing is 
recognizable as an example of NN.  Countries that employ a 
worldwide tax system credit the explicit taxes paid by their 
                                                 
68 The traditional view of tax sparing views the host country as having a choice what 
tax rate to impose on different types of income.  In contrast, the implicit tax view of tax 
sparing described here, sees each country as setting the overall tax rate on investment 
income arising within its borders, but as being unable to set the total tax rate on each 
investment separately.  According to the implicit tax view, the source country can select 
what portion of the total tax rate on an asset is explicit tax and what portion is implicit 
tax by changing the explicit tax rate, but it cannot affect the total tax rate on the asset 
(without changing the total tax rate on all other assets in the economy).  That is because 
market competition will ensure that the total tax rate on all assets is the same for all 
assets within that country.  The observation that the total tax rate on all assets in a 
country is the same regardless of what explicit tax rates apply to different assets 
underscores the claim that implicit taxes are real taxes just as are explicit taxes. 
69 In 1999, Charlotte Crane observed that tax doctrine has ignored implicit taxes and 
challenged the tax community to think seriously about how tax law should be reshaped 
to take account of implicit taxes.  Charlotte Crane, Some Explicit Thinking About 
Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. Rev. 339 (1999).  In a series of articles, I draw on the 
economics of implicit taxes to explain why the cross-border dividend-stripping 
transactions in Compaq and IES Industries appeared to generate before-tax profits, but 
did not once allowance was made for implicit taxes.  Michael S. Knoll, Implicit Taxes 
and Pretax Profit in Compaq and IES Industries, 114 Tax Notes 679 (2007), reprinted 
46 Tax Notes Int’l 1361 (2007); Michael S. Knoll, Implicit Taxes and Economic 
Substance, 115 Tax notes 397 (2007); Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux:  Implicit 
Taxes and the Question of Pretax Profit, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 821 (2007).  This essay 
provides another example where tax doctrine has become confused because implicit 
taxes were overlooked. 
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residents on foreign source income.  Such an action is seen as 
consistent with CEN.  In contrast, those same countries (unless 
they have a tax sparing agreement) (tacitly) allow a deduction for 
implicit taxes incurred abroad.  The deduction of foreign taxes is 
not consistent with CEN, but rather is consistent with NN, which is 
widely rejected as an inappropriate welfare benchmark for 
international tax systems.  
 
2. Tax sparing ensures that direct subsidies are taxed 
the same as tax incentives 
 
The recognition that competition tends to push the total tax 
rates on different assets into equality also uncovers the error in 
another criticism that is frequently leveled against tax sparing.  
Critics of tax sparing correctly note that tax incentives are a 
subsidy.  Tax incentives are a subsidy with a real economic cost 
similar to that of a direct subsidy.  These critics further argue that 
the tax consequences of a direct subsidy and a tax incentive are 
similar without tax sparing, but that the subsidy is less attractive 
than the tax incentive with tax sparing.   Thus, these critics 
conclude that this difference underscores the inappropriateness of 
tax sparing as well as creating incentives for countries to use tax 
incentives instead of direct incentives.  In contrast, tax sparing 
creates an incentive to favor tax incentives over direct 
incentives.70 
 
That argument can be illustrated using the example.  Assume 
that country B, the host country, instead of offering a tax holiday 
offers a direct subsidy to the owner of the candidate investment in 
year 1 of 4 percent of the year 0 purchase price of $1000, or $40.  
That subsidy is equal in value to the tax incentive in the original 
example and replaces that incentive.  As the argument goes, the 
investor will earn $100 from the candidate investment and receive 
a $40 payment from the government.  Regardless of how the 
subsidy is taxed in the source country, as long as it is taxed in the 
country of residence, an investor from country B will report $140 
income and pay $70 in taxes to the tax authorities from countries 
A and B and so will be left with $1070 after tax.  Alternatively, if 
country A provides a $40 tax incentive, the investor will receive 
$1100 and pay $10 tax to country B and be left with $1090.  The 
difference, $20, is the tax that country A insists be assessed on 
the direct subsidy provided by country B to an investor from 
country A.  (Note that if country A does not offer tax sparing, then 
the investor ends up with $1060, less than either amount.) 
 
                                                 
70 See discussion in Brooks, supra note [], at [38-39]. 
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The error in the analysis given above is that no allowance was 
made for the impact of the subsidy or tax incentive on cash 
flows.71  That is clear from the example, which treated the cash 
flow from the investment as $1100 and hence the profit as $100 in 
both cases.  In a competitive market, the value of the subsidy is 
competed away and so the investor’s profit from the investment 
(excluding the subsidy) is only $60 when there is a $40 untaxed 
subsidy, which yields a total profit of $100.  Thus, if a direct 
subsidy of $40 is offered to the investor from country A – and 
presumably then to other investors as well – the cash flow on the 
candidate investment in one year will fall to $1060.  The investor 
will also receive a cash subsidy payment of $40 and so will have 
$1100.  Of that $1100, the investor will report $100 income and so 
will pay $50 tax in total.  (The investor’s total tax is $50 as long as 
country A will not allow the investor to exclude the subsidy from 
taxable income.72)  That tax will exactly offset the subsidy, leaving 
the investor with $1050 as with tax sparing.   Thus, tax sparing or 
crediting the implicit tax ensures that the tax treatment of direct 
subsidies and tax incentives is the same.  In contrast, when 
implicit taxes are not credited, then direct incentives are more 
attractive than tax incentives.  
 
3. Tax sparing precisely offsets the disadvantage from 
foreign tax incentives 
 
A third argument that is regularly made by proponents of tax 
sparing is that tax sparing is necessary in order to promote the 
competitiveness of domestic investors abroad.  Although some 
critics of tax sparing have questioned whether tax incentives and 
tax sparing will affect the location of investment, most 
commentators – regardless of their position on tax sparing – 
accept the notion that tax sparing will increase ownership of 
foreign assets by home country investors.  Instead, the critics of 
tax sparing respond by arguing such a claim does not justify tax 
sparing in particular.  Instead, such a claim, they argue, is a 
general appeal for lower taxes and leads not to tax sparing, but to 
the exemption of foreign source income from taxation in the 
country of residence.  And, as always, there is a trade-off between 
lower taxes here and higher taxes somewhere else.  For example, 
such an argument does not provide a reason to prefer tax sparing 
                                                 
71 A similar observation has previously been made by other authors, including 
McDaniel, Identification, supra note [], at 276; McDaniel, Policy Analysis, supra note 
[], at 274-76; Shannon, supra note []. 
72 The subsidy might not be directly taxable to the investor if, say, country B paid some 
of the investor’s expenses by paying workers to work for the investor so the investor 
paid lower wages. 
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over lower taxes on foreign investors generally.  More to the point, 
such an argument says nothing specific about tax sparing. 
 
 
In contrast with that standard argument for tax sparing as 
improving competitiveness generally, the implicit tax argument 
developed here provides a more specific and tailored argument 
for tax sparing.  The approach developed here notes that there 
are two kinds of taxes – implicit and explicit – but only one kind of 
tax is regularly credited.  Moreover, because source countries can 
shift the distribution of the total tax between those two kinds of 
taxes, but not the sum, it is clear the double tax faced by domestic 
investors when there is not tax sparing.  Viewed from such a 
perspective, tax sparing or crediting implicit taxes, is a tailored 
response that addresses a specific and genuine competitiveness 
concern. 
 
Furthermore, if a country does not credit implicit taxes incurred 
abroad, it is handing foreign governments a method for 
disadvantaging its investors. All the foreign country has to do is to 
grant tax incentives for targeted industries. Those incentives will 
create implicit taxes that replace explicit taxes for the home 
country investors- and for countries with territorial tax systems- but 
that are in addition to the taxes paid by foreign investors from 
countries with world wide tax systems. Thus, tax sparing can be 
seen as part of a competitiveness agenda.73 
 
4. If tax sparing should be prohibited so as to 
discourage countries from offering tax incentives, 
then countries with territorial tax systems should also 
be required to adopt measures that discourage tax 
incentives 
 
Another argument frequently made against tax sparing is that 
tax sparing discourages host countries from granting harmful tax 
incentives.  According to this view, the real problem is with tax 
incentives.  Tax incentives are viewed by some critics of tax 
sparing as a form of extortion practiced by MNEs, as wasteful 
government spending, as harmful tax competition, or as diverting 
investment from more efficient to less efficient locations.74 
                                                 
73 In this regard, it is worth nothing one of the techniques that U.S.-based foreign 
investors use to mitigate the foreign trade credit’s failure to incorporate implicit taxes. 
By keeping money invested abroad, and delaying repatriations, foreign investors can 
defer their U.S. tax payment. This is a form of self-manufactured crediting, but it is not 
limited to such situations. 
74 OECD, Reconsideration, supra note [], at 25-27. 
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Of course, if the problem is with tax incentives, and 
presumably with other investment incentives as well, that problem 
can be addressed directly by rules that prohibit inappropriate 
investment incentives.  In general, a more direct approach is likely 
to be more transparent and more effective than an indirect 
approach.  Viewed from such a perspective, the argument against 
tax sparing is that countries have an obligation not to grant tax 
sparing so as to discourage tax incentives.  That obligation might 
run to the citizens of the host country (if tax incentives are waste 
or a form of extortion) or to taxpayers everywhere (if tax incentives 
are a form of tax competition or produce inefficient diversion).  
However, if there is such an obligation, then there is no reason to 
exempt residents of countries with territorial tax systems from that 
same obligation, which is in fact what happens with a territorial tax 
system.  If countries have an obligation to prevent their resident 
overseas investors from enjoying the benefits of tax incentives, 
then presumably such an obligation also applies to countries that 
employ a territorial tax system.75 
 
The most direct way to impose such an obligation on territorial 
countries and to ensure that it is of the same magnitude for 
countries with a territorial tax system as for countries with a 
worldwide tax system is to require the former to soak up the tax 
incentive with a special tax.  The special tax would be on the 
income foregone by country B at the tax rate generally imposed 
by country B.  As applied to the example, country C would have to 
impose a tax at 40 percent on the $100 income foregone by 
country B.  Of course, an accurate and correct tax would require 
ascertaining the pretax income of the country C investor before 
the effect of the incentive.76  
 
                                                 
75 One way to think of the difference between territorial and worldwide taxation is that 
the former both credits implicit taxes and treats differences in national rates of return as 
an implicit tax.  A worldwide tax system does not credit implicit taxes in any way.  In 
effect, what I propose in this essay is that a worldwide tax system credit implicit taxes, 
but that it not go so far as to treat cross-border differences in rates of return as implicit 
taxes.  Such a proposal, if adopted, would preserve the principal difference in how 
territorial and worldwide tax systems deal with ordinarily taxed investments (when 
countries have different tax rates) while bringing more closely together how those two 
systems deal with differentially taxed investments. 
76 Because the tax is intended as a penalty to discourage host country behavior, and so 
where it has its intended effect, it is not collected, the tax does not have to be assessed 
as accurately as the tax sparing proposal offered in the text.  
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B.  A Broad Credit for Implicit Taxes 
The decision by a country with a worldwide tax system to give 
a tax credit for the tax that the source country imposes, but does 
not collect when it grants tax incentives is called tax sparing.  The 
1998 OECD report adopted a negative tone towards tax sparing, 
and tax sparing has been on the wane since then.  Countries that 
grant tax sparing do so as a concession, generally only to less 
developed or developing countries, and only through bilateral 
treaties.   Tax sparing provisions are also limited.  They typically 
apply only with respect to certain specifically enumerated taxes 
and for only a fixed and predetermined length of time. 
 
In contrast, with such negotiated and narrow grants of tax 
sparing, the arguments developed in Parts III and IV are not so 
limited.  Instead, those arguments imply that countries that employ 
a worldwide tax system should automatically grant tax sparing 
covering all other countries and all tax incentives.77  Moreover, 
such arguments do not imply that a credit would only be available 
when the investment is made in a country at or a below a specific 
level of development.  Instead, the credit would apply to 
investments in all countries regardless of their level of 
development.78  Moreover, those arguments imply that such a 
grant be of indefinite duration.79 
                                                 
77 There is a view that the United States has given away too much in its tax law so that 
when it comes time to sit down with foreign governments to negotiate tax treaties all of 
the leverage is gone.  Accordingly, the United States might not want to offer automatic 
foreign tax credits for implicit taxes, but to negotiate with other countries whether to do 
so.  In that case, the United States should be open to negotiating not the narrow tax 
sparing provision of the past, but the general type of provision advocated in this essay. 
78 As is widely recognized, the United States and nearly all other countries with tax 
systems provide a wide range of investment incentives both through the tax system and 
elsewhere.  However, what is not as widely recognized is that such tax incentives – 
whether they are described as tax incentives and narrowly tailored or are broad and 
deeply embedded in the tax system – disadvantage foreign investors from countries 
with worldwide tax systems.  A credit for implicit taxes would prevent tax incentives 
from determining the ownership of assets.  Without such a credit, investment tax 
incentives will continue to disadvantage investors from countries with worldwide tax 
systems, such as the United States. 
79 The system for providing a foreign tax credit for implicit taxes incurred abroad that is 
described in this essay bears a resemblance to, but is broader than a proposal offered by 
McDaniel for the United States to unilaterally provide a foreign tax credit to U.S. 
overseas investors for tax incentives provided by less developed and developing 
countries that would be classified as subsidies under a tax expenditure analysis.  See 
McDaniel, Identification, supra note [], at 276; McDaniel, supra note [], at 273-76.  
Thus, under McDaniel’s tax expenditure analysis the key question is whether a direct 
subsidy would be included in taxable income.  That is because McDaniel’s approach 
endeavors to treat direct and tax subsidies the same.  Accordingly, if the direct subsidy 
were not included in income, then neither would the tax incentive be included in 
income.  In contrast with the analysis under tax expenditure analysis, the implicit tax 
approach developed in this essay involves a three-way comparison among direct 
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C.  The Obstacles in Implementing a Foreign Tax Credit for 
Implicit Taxes 
In the last section, I described how countries with worldwide 
tax systems can extend the foreign tax credit system to cover 
implicit terms on the same terms as they cover explicit taxes.  In 
the section before that, I argued that such a proposal has a 
number of advantages.  Specifically, I showed that an expanded 
foreign tax credit is consistent with the logic of a worldwide tax 
system and the foreign tax credit because it ensures that all 
income is taxed once and only once.  It also will eliminate the 
current difference in the tax treatment of tax incentives and other 
investment incentives.  In addition, and no doubt of substantial 
importance to many policymakers and business people, such an 
expanded foreign tax credit, if enacted, will also eliminate the tax-
induced disadvantage at which investors from countries with 
worldwide tax systems find themselves relative to investors from 
countries with territorial tax systems and from the source country 
when the source country offers tax incentives.  In this section, I 
look briefly at the possibility of implementing such a proposal. 
 
The obvious difficulty with implementing such a proposal is 
that in order to calculate the implicit tax it is first necessary to 
define the baseline against which that tax is measured.  Implicit 
taxes, as opposed to say, tax expenditures, are measured not 
relative to an ideal baseline, but to an actual existing economic 
baseline.  The use of an actual (rather than an ideal) baseline has 
several advantages.  First, it eliminates the possibility of the 
source country manipulating the country of residence’s foreign tax 
credit that concerned critics of tax sparing.  An increase in tax 
rates on the books that is not applied has no impact on 
transactions and so does not affect the calculation of implicit 
taxes.  Second, it places investors from different jurisdictions on 
an equal footing.  The use of an ideal baseline would treat 
investors from a worldwide jurisdiction differently than investors 
from the source jurisdiction or from territorial jurisdictions or even 
from other worldwide jurisdictions.  There is, however, one major 
disadvantage from the use of an actual baseline:  implicit taxes 
are notoriously difficult to measure in real markets.  They are 
                                                                                                                       
subsidies, tax incentives, and assets that do not benefit from direct subsidies or tax 
incentives (normally taxed assets).  Because market forces tend to equalize the after-tax 
rate of return across different assets, the implicit tax approach ties the tax treatment of 
differentially taxed assets to that of other assets in the economy.  In this way, an 
analysis based on implicit taxes answers the underlying question left often by tax 
expenditure analysis:  when should a direct subsidy be included in taxable income? 
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typically estimated by scholars using methodologies that although 
well established and powerful lack the precision that is expected 
for the assessment of tax liabilities.  That raises the specter of 
public and private attempts to influence how taxes are assessed 
and the actual or perceived arbitrariness of tax assessments.  At 
the very least, the matter of implementation would appear to be a 
major problem that needs to be addressed before such a system 
could be implemented. 
 
D.  Implications for the Debate over Territorial and Worldwide 
Taxation    
Even if the practical problems in extending the foreign tax 
credit to cover implicit taxes on the same terms as explicit taxes 
are insurmountable so that such a tax system is impractical, the 
discussion and analysis in this essay still has much to contribute 
to current discussions of international tax policy.  Specifically, the 
arguments and examples in this essay are relevant to the ongoing 
controversy over whether countries should adopt territorial or 
worldwide taxation.  Almost all economic analyses of alternative 
international tax regimes assume at least tacitly that all 
investments in any single economy are taxed the same.  Such 
analyses, thus, make no allowance for differentially taxed assets.  
Yet, differentially taxed assets are ubiquitous.80 
 
As this essay demonstrates, tax considerations will affect the 
ownership of such differentially taxed assets.  There are efficiency 
reasons to believe that such ownership neutrality is desirable.81  
Accordingly, in a world with differentially taxed assets, a territorial 
tax regime can achieve such neutrality whereas a worldwide 
regime cannot unless it credits implicit taxes as described in this 
essay.  Alternatively, if tax and other investment incentives are 
seen as a problem that needs to be addressed and the practice 
discouraged, then there is an argument for a worldwide tax 
system without tax sparing.  That argument, however, is linked 
with an argument that countries refrain from employing tax and 
other investment incentives.  Moreover, such an argument calls 
upon countries with territorial tax systems to either abandon those 
systems or to impose punitive taxes on domestic investors that 
                                                 
80 For example, in the United States, interest is generally taxed as it accrues consistent 
with the notion of economic income.   In contrast, the use of depreciation schedules that 
do not mimic the actual decline in value of an asset over time means that such assets are 
taxed differently than interest bearing assets.  Also, many depreciable assets are taxed 
differently from one another.  In addition, the realization requirement because of the 
benefit of deferral causes other assets to be taxed still differently.  
81 See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax 
Reform, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 487 (2003).  
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benefit from foreign investment incentives.  Furthermore, unless 
one is prepared to take a strong stance against investment 
incentives (or to argue against the importance of ownership 
neutrality), the prevalence of differentially taxed assets places an 
additional burden on proponents of strengthening worldwide 
taxation by eliminating deferral.82  Such reforms would exacerbate 
the disadvantage from not crediting implicit taxes. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The United States has a long-standing opposition to tax 
sparing.  Tax sparing is seen by its critics as an undesirable form 
of development aid, as inconsistent with fundamental tax 
principles, especially the notion that all income should be taxed 
once and only once, as encouraging the provision of tax 
incentives, and as not responding precisely to any specific tax-
induced disadvantage. 
 
Tax sparing, however, should not be seen as a concession 
from the country of residence to the country of source, nor should 
it be seen as a form of development aid.  Most important, tax 
sparing is not inconsistent with the basic principles that give rise 
to the foreign tax credit – that all income should be taxed once 
and only once.  Instead, tax sparing is required by that principle.  
In addition, tax sparing would not encourage governments to use 
tax incentives over other investment incentives.  Instead, a tax 
sparing credit calculated in the manner recommended here would 
treat both tax incentives and other subsidies the same. 
 
The existing foreign tax credit distinguishes between explicit 
and implicit taxes.  It recognizes and therefore credits only the first 
kind of tax.  Yet implicit taxes are also real taxes.  The failure of 
the foreign tax credit to credit implicit taxes means that investors 
resident in a country with a worldwide tax system who compete for 
foreign assets supported by tax incentives pay tax twice on their 
income – first implicitly abroad and then explicitly at home.  The 
resulting higher tax burden disadvantages such investors when 
they compete against other investors – investors from the source 
country, investors from countries with territorial tax systems, and 
investors from countries with worldwide tax systems that offer tax 
sparing. 
 
The solution is also clear: crediting implicit taxes incurred 
abroad on the same terms as explicit taxes incurred abroad.  
                                                 
82 Among the proponents of such a regime are Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, supra note []. 
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Doing so will ensure that foreign income is taxed once, not twice.  
It will also improve the competitiveness of domestic firms when 
foreign governments provide tax incentives.  There are, however, 
likely to be substantial practical difficulties in implementing such a 
system – most obviously with measuring implicit taxes.  The 
refusal to do so only ensures double taxation of the income of 
resident investors who look to invest in countries that grant tax 
incentives.  For such investors, the term “tax incentive” is a 
misnomer.  For them, foreign tax incentives are “tax 
disincentives.”  And they will remain tax disincentives until host 
countries stop offering tax incentives or until resident countries 
either adopt territorial tax systems or start crediting implicit taxes 
on the same terms as explicit taxes.
 
 
 
Table 1 
Tax Disadvantage to Investors from Country A 
From a Tax Incentive Offered by Country B 
(one-period investment) 
 
Tax Rate on 
Candidate 
Investment 
(percent) 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0
Cash Flow $1,100.00 $1,092.31 $1,085.71 $1,080.00 $1,075.00 $1,070.59 $1,066.67 $1,063.16 $1,060.00
Value in Source $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $1,000.00
Value in 
Residence $1,000.00 $993.01 $987.01 $981.82 $977.27 $973.26 $969.70 $966.51 $963.64
Difference $0.00 -$6.99 -$12.99 -$18.18 -$22.73 -$26.74 -$30.30 -$33.49 -$36.36
Percent 
Difference 0.00% -0.70% -1.30% -1.82% -2.27% -2.67% -3.03% -3.35% -3.64%
 
 
